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Heterogenous Beliefs and Employee Stock Options
Abstract
This paper uses a market valuation model to explore why firms grant employee stock
options. When insider managers and outside investors have different opinions about the
future prospects of the firm, employee stock options can be used to capture future investor
overvaluation and to save employee compensation costs. Options can enhance the stock
value for existing shareholders if the difference in opinion is highly volatile. The equi-
librium option grant is positively correlated with both the perception error of investors,
and the volatility of this error, as well as the correlation between investors’ error and firm
fundamental value. The model provides implications on the cross-sectional differences in
option grants, and these implications can be examined empirically.
1 Introduction
An employee stock option is an agreement between a firm and its employees under which
the employees can buy a specified number of shares of stock at a specified price. Over the
past decade, the use of employee stock options has been rising dramatically, and options have
become a large part of employee compensation. For example, here we quote Schwarzbach of
Aon Consulting in Financial Times (“US Stock Options” by Kerry Townsend, Nov 17, 2000):
Technology companies were able to attract a lot of talent by offering less than com-
petitive salaries for executives. They could hire managers who would normally
make $150,000, and would only pay them $70,000 with lots of stock options.
Apparently, the managers in this case are paid the remaining $80,000 in stock options. Why
do firms prefer options to cash compensation? How do options affect the value of external
shareholder’s stocks? This paper examines these issues in a general equilibrium setting.
The model is based on the assumption that investors and firm insiders may have different
opinions about the firm’s future profitability. A difference in opinion implies that the market
value of the firm may be different from the fundamental value perceived by the insider man-
ager.1 For example, if investors are more optimistic than the manager, the share price will
be higher than the firm value per share. In this case, a rational manager would want to sell
extra shares to investors. However, asymmetric information models such as Myers and Majluf
(1984) show that an equity offering is generally a signal of market overvaluation and that the
share price will decrease as a consequence. Empirical works by Loughran and Ritter (1995),
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) find that market reactions to seasoned equity offerings are
negative. Therefore, the firm will incur an information cost if it sells equity directly.
Suppose the manager believes that investors’ estimation of the firm value will vary in
the future. Sometimes investors will overestimate the firm value and sometimes investors
1Here, fundamental value is the firm value perceived by the managers; it may or may not be the “true” value
of the firm.
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will underestimate it. Thus, from the manager’s perspective, it is always possible that the
market price will be higher than the fundamental value. The manager can either wait and
issue new equity whenever investors are over-optimistic in the future, or the manager can use
employee stock options to capture future investor overvaluation immediately. To understand
the intuition, note that options by contract design will be exercised only when share price is
above the strike price. The firm issues new shares to employees when options are exercised
and employees can sell these new shares to investors. When new shares are issued, the firm
receives cash proceeds from the exercise of options and employees get the difference between
the market and strike prices. If employees exercise their options when the share price is
high, the firm effectively sells over-valued equity to outside investors. Therefore, optimistic
investors overpay for shares at the time of option exercise and effectively subsidize the firm
by compensating employees.
This model generates a number of interesting implications. As long as investors’ misper-
ception is highly volatile, it might be optimal for firms to grant employee stock options even
when they are currently undervalued. However, firms are more likely to grant options when
they are overvalued at the time of option grant. Because employee stock options are generally
issued at-the-money, high market valuation at the time of option grant sets a high strike price
for options. This benefits the firm by keeping a larger part of new share issue proceeds during
option exercise. On the other hand, both employee risk aversion and the volatility of firm
fundamental value reduce the firm’s incentive to grant options. In the equilibrium, the number
of options granted is positively correlated with both the perception error of investors, and the
volatility of this error, as well as the correlation between investors’ error and firm fundamental
value. The fundamental volatility reduces the equilibrium option grant.
Financial constraints introduce an interesting pecking order in terms of financing choices
by the firm. That is, options are used first to fill small budget shortfalls, and equities are used
next to raise large amount of money. Financing with options is more efficient because it has
a lower information cost. In addition, because options bring the proceeds of selling future
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equity to the present, they are more effective when firms are moderately undervalued at the
financing time.
There is already a large literature on employee stock options. Suggested motivations for
broad-based stock options include incentive (Kedia and Mozumdor (2002)), liquidity con-
straint (Core and Guay (2001)), employee retention (Ittner, Lambert and Larker (2001), Oyer
(2001)) and employee sorting (Lazear (2001), Oyer and Schaefer (2001)). This paper argues
that options can be used to sell overvalued equity indirectly. Thus it complements this litera-
ture and provides a new rationale for broad-based employee stock options.
This paper is also related to several papers studying rational behavior in an irrational world.
Stein (1996) studies a rational manager’s capital budgeting choice when investors do not value
stock correctly. Shleifer and Vishny (2001) model acquisitions as driven by market valuations.
In their model, investors who buy overvalued shares of a merged firm are subsidizing the
original shareholders of both the bidder firm and the target firm. In my model, the same
investors are subsidizing both employees holding stock options and the original shareholders.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the base case model. Section 3
solves the equilibrium and presents the main results for the model. The extension of the base
case model to allow for equity offering, tax effects and financial constraints is presented in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Consider a firm in a two-period economy, with time indexed by t = 0,1,2. The economy is
populated with investors, a manager and employees. At time 0, the firm has liquid assets in
place, A, and a positive net-present-value project. This project requires a number of employees
to develop and market it, and generates an uncertain revenue of z2 at time 2. The firm is liqui-
dated to all shareholders after the revenue is generated. The project is human capital intensive,
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and the only cost of the project is employee compensation. Employees are homogeneous and
risk averse. There is a large pool of employees from which the firm can hire.2 Employees can
earn an aggregate cash compensation of CA payable at time 1 if they work elsewhere. Because
the pool of available employees is large, the firm holds all the bargaining power. Hence the
firm can either pay employees CA in cash, or a combination of cash and stock options which
provide employees the same expected utility as fixed compensation. For a sketch of the time
line, see Figure 1. The interest rate is normalized to zero.
2.1 Beliefs about future revenue
The key assumption of the model is that investors and the manager have different beliefs about
future revenue. This is modeled as follows: At time 1, the manager believes that the project
revenue at time 2, z2, has a normal distribution with mean z1 and variance σ21. z1 is a random
variable at time 0. The manager believes that z1 is normally distributed with mean µz and
variance σ20. By iterating conditional expectation, it is easy to show that the manager’s belief
about z2 at time 0 is that z2 is normally distributed with mean µz and variance σ20+σ21.
The investors’ belief on z2 at time 1 is different from the manager’s. They believe that
z2 is normally distributed with mean w and variance σ21. Note that investors and the manager
have different mean estimates for z2 but the same variance estimate. The same variance is a
simplifying assumption but it does not affect the results, because in most of following analysis
variance σ21 does not enter the calculation. Let d1 = w− z1. Then, d1 measures the difference
between investors’ belief and manager’s belief. When d1 is positive, investors are more op-
2This assumption gives all the bargaining power to the firm, so that the firm can extract all the gain from
the project. If the number of employees qualified to work on the project is limited, then employees are likely to
extract a share of the gain. To model this would require an explicit model on the bargaining game between the
firm and its employees, and that is beyond the scope of this paper. However, our results are not sensitive to this
assumption because as long as employees do not get all the surplus from the project, any action to increase the
surplus is beneficial to the firm as well.
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timistic than the manager, and when d1 is negative, investors are more pessimistic. At time
0, w is a random variable and investors believe its probability density is also normal. Instead
of specifying the mean and variance for w, we define parameters for the distribution of d1.
Because both w and z1 are normal random variables at time 0, d1 is also a random variable
with normal density. Let the mean of d1 be µd and the variance of d1 be σd . Furthermore, let
the correlation between d1 and z1 be ρ. That is, z1
d1
∼ n
 µz
µd
 ,
 σ20 ρσ0σd
ρσ0σd σ2d
 . (1)
Then it is easy to see that the mean and variance of w are µz + µd and σ20 + 2ρσ0σd +σ2d .
By iterative conditional expectation, investors expect z2 is distributed with mean µz + µd and
variance σ20+2ρσ0σd +σ2d +σ21.
Investors’ beliefs are common knowledge to everyone. The manager knows his own be-
liefs, but investors do not know, or consider, the manager’s expectation of z2. Investors are
only concerned about their own projection of the future project revenue. As will become clear
in the next section, investors here can be considered as a representative agent who determines
the firm share price. There may be some investors who hold the same belief as the manager
and some who hold different beliefs. As long as the belief of the representative investor is
different from the manager’s, the current model is valid.
In the majority of this paper, it is stated that the manager has the correct belief about future
prospects of the firm and investors have wrong beliefs. In this sense, the manager is rational
and investors are irrational. It does not affect any of the results if the reverse is true. That is,
investors are perfectly rational and have the correct assessment of the profitability of the firm,
while the manager is irrational.
Employees are assumed to sell stocks immediately after option exercise.3 Because of this,
employees’ beliefs about the project outcome do not affect the model outcome. However,
3This assumption is made to make the computation of employee option value tractable. However, because
most frequent option users do not pay any dividend, it is optimal to sell stocks after exercising non-expiring
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employees understand the belief system of investors and they are able to correctly assess the
distribution of future share price. From this distribution, employees can calculate the expected
payoff of their options.
2.2 Stock and share price
The firm’s stock is traded in the market at time 0 and time 1. The firm is liquidated to all
shareholders at time 2, after the realization of revenue z2. At time 0, the number of shares
outstanding is normalized to 1. Stocks are held by investors only, and investors are assumed
to have the following demand curve:
D0 =
1
γ0 (F
I
0 −P0), (2)
D1 =
1
γ1 (F
I
1 −P1), (3)
where D0 and D1 are investor demands at time 0 and time 1, γ0 and γ1 denote the slopes of
the downward-sloping demand curves at time 0 and 1 respectively. F I0 and F I1 are the expected
liquidation value of one unit of stock based on investors’ expectation at the two dates, while P0
and P1 are share prices. This type of demand function can be derived if investors are assumed
to have exponential utility and fundamental values are normally distributed. Kyle and Xiong
(2001) apply the same demand function for long term investors in their model. For empirical
evidence on the shape of stock demand curves, see Shleifer (1986), Kaul, Mehrotra and Morck
(2000). Furthermore, γ0 is assumed to be greater than γ1. That is, investors require a larger
discount at time 0 than at time 1. This is a reasonable assumption because the variance on
project revenue at time 0 is greater than the variance at time 1. In the case of exponential
utility and normality, it can be shown that γ is positively correlated with the variance of the
fundamental value.
options. Actually, most employees sell stocks immediately following option exercise (Heath, Huddart and Lang
(1999)).
6
Share prices are determined by the market clearing condition. If the firm does not grant
options or engage in any equity offering, the supply is 1. Otherwise, the supply is 1 plus the
number of options exercised or the number of shares offered. We will focus on options in this
section and address equity offerings in Section 4.
2.3 Options
The manager might grant stock options to employees at time 0. These options mature at
time 1 and they have strike price K. Employees have perfect knowledge of investors’ revenue
expectations and demand curves. At time 1, employees decide whether to exercise the options,
and share prices are then set by the market clearing condition. The share supply increases if
options are exercised and remains constant otherwise. Because employees are rational and
have all the necessary information to compute the price impact of option exercise, they will
choose to exercise their options only if the share price after exercise is higher than the strike
price. In addition, it is assumed that options are held by a diverse group of employees, and
that their competition in exercising options would cause either all options to be exercised or
none to be exercised. This rules out the scenario where part of the options may be exercised.
Suppose that the firm pays employees with x options and cash amount C. First, the condi-
tion for option exercise at time 1 needs to be determined. If options are exercised, share price
Pe1 is determined from the following market clearing condition,
1
γ1 (F
Ie
1 −Pe1) = 1+ x (4)
where F Ie1 is the expected fundamental value of one share of stock given a share increase of x,
in particular,
F Ie1 =
A+w+xK−C
1+x . (5)
In Equation (5), the expected liquidation value of the whole firm is the sum of initial asset A,
(investors’) expected project revenue w, and the cash inflow from option exercise xK, less the
cash compensation paid to employees C. Because of option exercise, there is a dilution effect
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and the total number of shares outstanding becomes 1+ x. Hence the value for each share is
simply the firm value divided by the number of shares.
Substitute F Ie1 in Equation (4) and the share price after option exercise can be solved,
Pe1 =
A−C+w+xK
1+x − γ1(1+ x) (6)
Employees exercise options only when they are in-the-money. Thus the condition for
option exercise is Pe1 ≥ K, or equivalently,
w≥ K−A+C+ γ1(1+ x)2 (7)
The expected value of each option at time 0 is then the expected option payoff over the
random variable w. Let Q= K−A+C+γ1(1+x)2. Recall that w is normally distributed with
mean µw = µz + µd and variance σ2w = σ20 +σ2d + 2ρσ0σd . Hence the expected option value
can be rewritten as
E0[(Pe1 −K)+] =
∫
[A−C+w+xK1+x − γ1(1+ x)−K]+ f (w)d w
= 11+x
∫
[w−Q]+ f (w)d w
= 11+x [σwn(G)+(µw−Q)N(G)] (8)
where G= µw−Qσw , n(·) and N(·) are the probability density function and cumulative probability
function of the standard normal distribution. The last equation uses the result of integrating
normal random variable in the Appendix.
Employees are risk averse, and they have all the information to compute this expected
value of options. Instead of assuming an explicit utility function for employees, we follow a
simple approach to denote the cash equivalent value of options as the expected option value
multiplied by a discount factor η, (0< η≤ 1). This η captures the risk aversion of employees.
If η is 1, employees are risk neutral. If η is small, then employees are risk averse and the cash
value equivalent to the variable option income is low.
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2.4 Share value at time 0
The share value at time 0 is the discounted expected liquidation value at time 2. When options
are exercised, this value is A−C+xK+z21+x . When options are not exercised, this value is A−C+z2.
The expected liquidation value of one share of stock is thus
E j0[V2] = E
j
0
[
A−C+xK+z2
1+x I(w≥ Q)+(A−C+ z2)I(w < Q)
]
, j ∈ {M, I}. (9)
The expectation is different for the manager and investors because they have different beliefs
about z2.
For the manager, the belief at time 0 is that z2 is normally distributed with mean µz and
variance σ20+σ21. It can be shown that the covariance between z2 and w, σz2w, is σ20+ρσ0σd .
Applying the integration results for the normal distribution (see the Appendix), the expected
value of one share from the perspective of the manager becomes
EM0 [V2] = A−C+µz+ x1+x
[
(K−A+C−µz)N(G)− σz2wσw n(G)
]
. (10)
On the other hand, investors project that the mean of z2 is µz + µd . Their belief on the
variance of z2 is σ2w+σ21. Thus the expected value of one share to investors is
EI0[V2] = A−C+µz+µd + x1+x
[
(K−A+C−µz−µd)N(G)− σz2wσw n(G)
]
. (11)
2.5 The manager’s optimization problem
The manager attempts to maximize the expected liquidation value for long-term sharehold-
ers at time 0. This is equivalent to maximizing the per-share liquidation value of the stock.
Suppose the manager owns a certain number of stocks at time 0 and is restricted from trading
at time 1. In this case, the exercise of employee stock options will cause a dilution in the
manager’s ownership of the company. The manager’s self-interest leads to maximizing the
manager’s own value at liquidation time.
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The simplest scenario is considered first. In this scenario, the firm is not cash constrained,
that is, A≥CA. The strategy of paying employees CA and pursuing the project would enhance
the firm value by an expected amount of EM0 (z2)−CA. Now the manager might grant x options
as part of the compensation package and reduce the cash payment to C. Hence the manager’s
optimization problem becomes
max
C,x
EM0 [V2] (12)
subject to
C+ηxE0[(Pe1 −K)+]≥CA (13)
C ≥ 0,x≥ 0. (14)
Equation (13) is the participation constraint of the employees. The cash salary and options
must be high enough to be equivalent to employees’ outside opportunities, CA.4
3 General results
3.1 Predetermined option strike price
First, consider the scenario where the option strike price is predetermined when the manager
grants options. In this case investors do not anticipate that the firm will issue options at time
0. Hence, given that investors’ projected revenue mean is µz + µd and that the demand curve
slope is γ0, the stock price without the option grants would be
Pno0 = (A−C+µz+µd)− γ0. (15)
4It does not affect the results qualitatively if the participation constraint is changed to a traditional expected
utility type.
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This price is derived from the expected fundamental value of a share from investors’ perspec-
tive, with the total supply of shares normalized to 1. To conform to the common practice of
issuing at-the-money options,5 the strike price K is set to equal Pno0 .
The equilibrium is where the manager optimizes his expected value per share (Equation
(12)) with the choices of C and x subject to the employee participation constraint (Equation
(13)), and the stock market clears. The equilibrium is solved numerically by finding solutions
to the first order conditions of the optimization problem (Equation (12)). For more details, see
the Appendix.
3.1.1 When to grant options
The first result is that options can improve shareholder values under certain circumstances.
This can be seen from Figures 2 and 3. These two figures show the thresholds of investor
misperception and future volatility of misperception (µd,σd), when options are granted in
the equilibrium. Because the manager maximizes shareholder value and he has the choice of
whether to grant options, observing options in the equilibrium indicates that employee stock
options enhance firm value in these cases.
The main intuition is that options enable the firm to sell overvalued equities at time 1.
To see this, note that the contract design of options indicates that options are exercised only
if the time 1 stock price is higher than the strike price. From the manager’s perspective,
investors are sometime optimistic and sometime pessimistic. Since when investors are over-
optimistic, stock prices are going to be high. The conditional probability of investors being
over-optimistic is high when stock prices are higher than the strike. Hence, option exercise is
5In practice, almost all employee stock options are issued at-the-money. Employee stock options that are not
at-the-money are less attractive to the firm for various reasons. The in-the-money options (i.e., discount options)
usually carry a tax disadvantage. Hall and Murphy (2000) show that out-of-the-money options (i.e., premium
options) are very costly because the cash equivalent values of out-of-the-money options are substantially low to
risk-averse employees.
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more likely to coincide with overvalued stocks. Unlike a direct equity offering, where the firm
receives the proceeds, employees actually obtain the proceeds of option exercise and the firm
receives the amount up to the strike price. However, since employees are expected to break
even in expected utility with or without options, the firm retains a part of the option exercise
proceeds through reduction of the employees’ cash salaries. The firm does not receive all
of the proceeds from the indirect equity sale through option exercise because employees are
risk averse and they consider the varying option income less valuable than a fixed wage. A
number of parameters affect the firm’s willingness to grant options in equilibrium. These are
illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. One natural question is why the firm does not issue equity when
investors are overoptimistic. This question is addressed in the next section. For now, issuing
options is the only strategy available to the firm.
Figure 2 considers the base setup in Section 2. The manager might not agree with investors,
reflected in a non-zero value of µd at time 0 and time 1. The manager also anticipates a
variation of this future difference given by σd . Figure 2 depicts the regions in the graph of µd
and σd where options are granted in equilibrium. Panel (a) is the base case with the following
set of parameters: A= 70,CA = 70,µz = 100,σ0 = σ1 = 20,η= 0.9,γ0 = 8,γ1 = 4,ρ= 0. The
project yields an average profit of 30. For a summary of all the parameters used in the model,
see Table 1.
The first observation is that options are granted when investors are more optimistic than
the manager, or when the volatility of investor misperception is high. When investors’ projec-
tion on firm profitability is higher than the manager’s, equity carries a high valuation and it is
logical for the firm to issue options to sell more shares. However, when investors underesti-
mate the firm’s profitability, both at the current time and in the future, granting options might
still be optimal if the volatility of investors’ misperception is sufficiently high. For example,
in the base case, if the investors’ expectation is ten below the manager’s, the firm still issues
options as long as the standard deviation of future misperception is higher than 28.5. The in-
tuition here is that the volatility more than offsets the lower projection. Call options by design
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capture only the positive half of the distribution. Large volatility in investor misperception en-
larges the positive half of the price distribution and thus increases the attractiveness of options
to the firm. This result has an interesting practical implication. The manager can choose to
grant options even if he is not sure whether the firm is currently overvalued or undervalued. As
long as the manager is sure that investors’ projections on firm profitability are highly volatile,
he can be confident that options will enhance shareholder value.
Panel (b) of Figure 2 shows the effect of changing employee risk-aversion parameter η.
Note that the further η is from one, the more risk averse the employees are. Because employees
get the same utility with or without options, higher risk aversion results in the firm obtaining a
smaller part of the option exercise proceeds. This can be inferred in Figure 2, where high risk
aversion (η = 0.85) pushes the option threshold northeast (higher relative investor projection
or greater volatility of misperception).
Panel (c) illustrates the effect of the correlation between fundamental value and investors’
misperception, and Panel (d) addresses fundamental volatility. Both correlation and funda-
mental volatility affect the option-issuing decision by changing the relative importance of
misperception volatility in determining the option value. Negative correlation implies that in-
vestors tend to be pessimistic when firm fundamental values are strong. This creates a damping
effect on the share price and discourages the firm from granting options. Positive correlation
has the opposite effect. Thus in Panel (c), the threshold line for positive correlation lies be-
low the threshold line for negative correlation, indicating that a firm grants options under a
wider range of parameters when the correlation between fundamental value and investors’
misperception is positive.
Fundamental volatility affects the firm’s option granting decision negatively. Both fun-
damental volatility and misperception volatility contribute to the volatility of share prices at
time 1. However, only the misperception volatility is beneficial to the manager. Option exer-
cise or, equivalently, new stock issue, benefits the firm when investors overestimate the firm
profitability at time 1. Hence, holding the misperception volatility constant while increasing
13
fundamental volatility actually reduces the relative weight of investor misperception in share
prices. Therefore, it is not surprising that high fundamental volatility makes the firm more
selective in granting options.
In the scenario of Figure 2, the manager holds a different belief from investors and this
belief does not change from time 0 to time 1. This is similar to the “random walk” assumption
from the efficient market literature.6 The manager may believe that the current price reflects
all the information available to investors and, without further information, investors should
hold the same view about the firm.
On the other hand, the manager might believe that investors’ beliefs are “mean reverting,”
that is, µd = 0. In other words, the manager expects that, on average, investors’ perception
is the same as the manager’s in the future (at time 1). However, the manager still expects a
certain level of variation of investors’ estimate. In addition, the mean estimate of z2 at time 0
may be different between investors and the manager. Let d0 be this difference. In this case, the
current misperception of the investors serves only to determine the strike price of options.7
Figure 3 illustrates the results under “mean-reverting” investors’ beliefs. Note that the
threshold lines never cross the σd = 0 axis. This implies that some positive misperception
volatility is required for the firm to consider granting options. This is not true in Figure 2
because with µd positive, the manager already expects investors to overvalue the firm at time
1. Hence, positive volatility of investor misperception is not a necessary condition for the
firm’s choice to grant options there.
Furthermore, it is optimal for the firm to grant options when the firm is undervalued (d0 <
0) at the time of option grant. Actually, because the current undervaluation does not affect
future investor expectation, d0 has a less pronounced impact on option grant decision in Figure
3 than it has in Figure 2. The fact that d0 still has some impact in Figure 3 is caused by
6See Fama (1970, 1991) for detailed reviews.
7In this case, investors do not follow iterative expectation. Nevertheless, this case is studied because it is
common belief that prices will come back to fundamental values in the long run.
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the option strike price, which is determined by d0. The effects of risk aversion, correlation
between fundamental value and misperception, and fundamental volatility are about the same
as in Figure 2. The intuitions are the same as well.
3.1.2 Comparative statistics
The comparative statistics of equilibrium option grant with respect to variables of interest
are shown in Figure 4. Panel (a) shows the relationship between option grant and current
investor perception. Current investor perception affects the current valuation of the equity, and
thus it also influences the relationship between equilibrium option grant and current market
valuation. Two scenarios are considered, persistent difference of beliefs (µd = d0) and long-run
convergence of beliefs (µd = 0). In both scenarios, when investors move from undervaluing
the project to slightly overvaluing it, the optimal option grant increases rapidly, but when
investors overvalue the firm by a large margin, the optimal option grant position continues to
increase, but at a much slower rate. Note that increasing the number of option grants always
reduces the probability that options will be in-the-money because of the market impact of
options. Initially, when the number of outstanding options is small, the value increase from
the number of options can fully offset the reduction in per-unit option value. When the number
of options is large, the incremental effect of an extra option can no longer offset the per-unit
value reduction. Hence the equilibrium option grant has this concave shape with respect to
investors’ misperception.
There is some difference between the two scenarios. When the mean misperception stays
the same, the firm starts to grant options when µd is around -4 and increases the number of
options granted rapidly as µd increases. When beliefs are converging (µd = 0), the lowest d0
for firm to grant options is -11. However, the number of option grants is less than it is in the
other case, when d0 becomes positive. This is caused by the difference in µd . Positive µd
implies that investors are likely to overvalue the firm at time 1 and therefore the firm wants to
issue more options to take advantage of that.
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Panel (b) shows the comparative statistics between option grant and correlation between
fundamental and misperceived values. There is a positive relationship. The intuition is the
same as we have discussed previously. Positive correlation between fundamental value and
misperception creates an amplifying effect between fundamental value and share price, while
negative correlation has a damping effect on share price. When the firm fundamental value and
misperception move in the same direction, the share price varies more and the misperception
part of the share price is high when the price is high. Because high share price coincides with
the time of option exercise, options are able to capture more of mispricing when the correlation
between fundamental value and misperception is positive. Therefore, in the equilibrium, the
number of option grant and correlation between fundamental and misperceived values is thus
positive.
The effect of fundamental volatility on equilibrium option grant is shown in Panel (c). The
trend is negative and option grant drops to zero after the fundamental volatility become too
large. On the other hand, the volatility of misperception has the opposite effect, as shown in
Panel (d). Both of these effects are driven by the same reason. Options are granted to sell
overvalued equity indirectly. The key feature of the option contract is that it becomes an eq-
uity offering when the share price is higher than the strike price. If shares are overvalued when
share price is higher than the strike price, then options are effective as a method to sell overval-
ued equity. The two volatility measures contribute to the relative probability of whether shares
are overvalued during option exercise. High misperception volatility increases the overvalue
probability while high fundamental volatility decreases this probability. This is why equi-
librium option grant decreases with fundamental volatility but increases with misperception
volatility.
3.1.3 Price effect
In the analysis so far, investors have a misperception µd on the firm profitability. Not antic-
ipating option grant, a share price is available from the demand equation (2). The manager
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makes the option grant decision setting the strike price to the existing share price. Because the
manager optimizes the stock value of shareholders from his own projection, obviously the firm
value is enhanced from the manager’s perspective. One interesting question is what the share
price is after investors observe that the firm is granting options. In other words, what is the an-
nouncement effect of option grant in this equilibrium? To answer this question, first calculate
the fundamental value of one share from the perspective of investors, EI0[V2], using Equation
(11). Then, compute the share price after option grant using the same demand equation. The
difference in share values is the announcement effect in this equilibrium.
Figure 5 illustrates the announcement effect for the scenario of persistent belief difference.
As can be seen from the figure, there is virtually no announcement effect from the investors’
perspective. Remember that investors believe that the project revenue has mean µz + µd . To
them, stocks are always fairly valued and there is no merit in issuing options to try to capture
future overvaluation. Hence the announcement effect is almost nonexistent.
3.2 Endogenous strike price
In the previous section, the option strike price is predetermined, which corresponds to the
scenario that investors do not anticipate the firm to grant options. Suppose investors fully
anticipate the firm to grant options and set share price accordingly at time 0, then the option
strike price will be determined endogenously. The equilibrium is constructed as follows: first
the manager decides to grant x at-the-money options and pay cash compensation C, then in-
vestors determine the share value after option grant and the share price from market clearing
condition and, finally, the option strike price must be equal to the share price at time 0. The
equilibrium is solved by adding the constraint on strike price to the maximization program:
K = EI0[V0]− γ0. (16)
Figure 6 shows the comparative statistics of equilibrium option grant with respect to mean
misperception (µd), correlation between fundamental value and investor misperception (ρ),
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fundamental volatility (σ0), and volatility of misperception (σd). The results are very similar
to the results when the strike price is predetermined as in Figure 4. This is related to the
previous result of virtually no price effect. The share value according to investors remains
almost the same before and after option grant. Hence the endogenously determined strike
prices do not differ too much from the predetermined strike prices. The comparative statistics
are then similar.
Before we proceed to extend this model, it is helpful to summarize the results so far:
1. When the manager perceives the firm profitability differently from investors, it might be
optimal for the manager to grant employee stock options to capture future overvaluation.
2. As long as the future volatility of investor misperception is large enough, granting op-
tions is optimal even when the firm is currently undervalued.
3. The decision to grant options is positively correlated with current and future misvalua-
tion, volatility of misperception, and correlation between fundamental value and misper-
ception, but negatively correlated with fundamental volatility and employee risk aver-
sion.
4. The equilibrium number of grant options is positively correlated with current and future
misvaluation, volatility of misperception, and correlation between fundamental value
and misperception, but negatively correlated with fundamental volatility.
4 Extensions
4.1 Equity offering
In the base model, the manager is not allowed to issue equity to capture the overvaluation of
the equity. A natural question is whether allowing the firm to issue equity changes the results.
The answer to this question depends on when an equity offering might occur and the cost of
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an equity offering. In this model, because trading occurs at times 0 and 1, it seems logical to
allow the firm to sell new shares at these two time points.
First, consider the case of equity offering at time 1. The sequence of events at time 1
can be modeled as follows: z1 and d1 are realized, the firm decides how many new shares to
sell to the market, investors determine the fundamental value of each share and their demand,
market clears by equating supply and demand, and share price is determined. If there is no
information cost from the equity offering, that is, the new equity does not change investors’
projection on firm profitability, z1+d1, then options are no longer needed to capture the market
overvaluation at time 1. The main rationale for the use of options in this model is to sell
overvalued equity at time 1 indirectly. If a direct sale does not reduce the overvaluation d1,
then direct equity offering would be more efficient to the firm.
However, both theory and empirical evidence argue that seasoned equity offerings do carry
negative information cost. For example, Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Spiess and Affleck-
Graves (1995) found that market reactions to seasoned equity offerings are negative. The
asymmetric information models such as Myers and Majluf (1984) show that equity offering
is generally a bad signal and thus new equities are discounted by the market. Actually, in the
current setup, because the manager observes d1 before deciding whether to issue new shares
and he will only do so if d1 is positive, equity offering is a signal for d1 > 0. Thus it is
reasonable to investors to adjust downward d1 after they see new shares coming to market. We
model this as
d′1(y) = d1−βy (17)
where y is the number of new shares offered (y≥ 0) and β is the rate that investors adjust their
beliefs, (β > 0). Note that option exercise is conditioned only on the stock price being higher
than the strike price, and it does not reveal anything about the manager’s belief. Hence the
current assumption of no information cost on option exercise is valid.8
8In practice, employees exercise their options for various reasons and thus may not necessarily reflect pri-
vate information about market valuation. See Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999) for a discussion of factors that
influence employee option exercise.
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To solve the optimal option grant and cash compensation for the manager (Equation 12),
given that the firm can judiciously issue new equity at a later time, is extremely complicated.
Here we are only going to show that the firm might still want to use options when it has the
choice to sell new shares with some information cost. The purpose is to show that there are
some strategies with non-zero amount of options and cash compensation that satisfy employee
participation constraint and produce higher shareholder values.
At time 1, z1 and d1 are realized and option amount x, option strike K, and cash compen-
sation C are already set. The manager needs to decide the optimal amount of shares to issue.
Suppose the number is y and share price is P1. Then, the fundamental value of one share to
investors is
F I1 =
A−C+z1+d′1(y)+xKI(e)+yP1
1+xI(e)+y , (18)
where I(e) is 1 for option exercise and 0 for no option exercise. Using the demand function of
investors (Equation 3) with the supply of all shares 1+xI(e)+y, the market clearing condition
is
1
γ1 (
A−C+z1+d′1(y)+xKI(e)+yP1
1+xI(e)+y −P1) = 1+ xI(e)+ y. (19)
Thus, P1 can be solved as a function of y and the manager attempts to choose y to maximize
the share value from his perspective,
max
y
FM1 =
A−C+z1+xKI(e)+yP1
1+xI(e)+y . (20)
Let y∗ be the solution to Equation (20). In this way, y∗ is the optimal number of new shares to
issue, given a realization of z1 and d1. The option payoff is simply
V o = (P1−K)+I(e) (21)
where option exercise I(e) is determined by new shares and share price at time 1.
The values EM0 (V2), EI0(V2), and E0(V o) are expectations of FM1 , F I1 and V o at time 0.
Because there are no close-form solutions for these expectations, we use Monte Carlo integral
to compute these expectations. In particular, 2000 draws of z1 and d1 are generated given their
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mean values and variance-covariance matrix.9 For each draw, optimal y∗ is found, and share
values according to the manager, investors, and option value are computed. Then, these values
are averaged over all 2000 draws and generate EM0 (V2), EI0(V2), and E0(V o).
In Table 2, a number of feasible strategies with different option grant levels x, cash com-
pensation C and their corresponding share values are presented. These strategies are found
using the following method: fix x and C, compute the expectations using Monte Carlo inte-
gral, check to see if employee participation constraint is satisfied, that is,
C+ηxE0(V o)≥CA, (22)
finally adjust C until this condition is just satisfied. As shown from the table, a small amount
of option grant x generates higher shareholder value than no option grant, while a large amount
of option grant generates lower shareholder value. Hence, as long as future equity offering has
some informational cost, the result that moderate option grant can enhance shareholder value
does not change.
Because options are used mainly to capture future share overvaluation, allowing equity
offering at time 0 does not change the result at all. For example, when the volatility of misper-
ception is large enough, the manager may grant options even if stock is undervalued at time 0.
Clearly, no rational manager would choose to offer equity if he thinks the stock is undervalued
and the firm is not financially constrained. We address this issue of financial constraint and
financing choices between equity and option in Section 4.3.
4.2 Tax treatment of options
Another issue that is omitted in the base model is tax. Since most of employee stock options
are nonqualified stock options, these options have interesting tax implications for both the firm
and employees. When nonqualified stock options are exercised, the difference between share
9The draws are generated by using 1000 random draws and 1000 antithetic values.
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price and option strike price is counted as ordinary employee compensation and subject to
personal income tax in the year of option exercise. On the other hand, the firm can deduct this
amount as cost and reduce its tax liability. Hence, the tax treatment of employee stock options
appears to make them more favorable to the firm and less so to employees. However, since
employees always break even, the net tax effect on the firm’s willingness to grant options is
not clear.10
In this section, we will show that the main result of this paper–employee stock options
can enhance shareholder value–does not change after considering tax issues. Consider the
following scenario: the firm is required to pay taxes on its profit at a rate of τc; employees are
taxed at a rate of τp for income above CA and not taxed for income less than CA. The personal
tax schedule is an oversimplified one but it captures the main spirit of the personal income tax
system: that is, large extra income may bump one into a high tax bracket and be subject to
higher tax rate. For the firm, the cost is the cash compensation C plus the deduction for option
exercise.
Given realization of z1 and d1 at time 1, the firm’s tax liability and share price are closely
related. Investors perceive the share value as
F I1 =
A−C+EI1(z2)+xKI(e)−EI1(tax)
1+xI(e) , (23)
where I(e) is 1 for option exercise and 0 for no option exercise, EI1(z2) is investors’ expectation
of project revenue, and EI1(tax) is the expected tax liability. Since the firm is liquidated at
time 2, there is no tax carryover in this model. The firm only needs to pay tax on its profit–the
amount of z2 over cash compensation C and option exercise deduction xI(e)(P1−K)+. Hence,
the expected tax liability is simply
EI1(tax) = E
I
1{τc[z2−C− xI(e)(P1−K)+]+}. (24)
10For an empirical analysis of tax impact of employee stock options, see Graham, Lang and Shackelford
(2002).
22
Investors believe that z2 is normally distributed with mean z1+d1 and variance σ21. Using the
integration result in the Appendix, the expected tax liability can be shown as
EI1(tax) = τcσ1[n(J)+ J N(J)] (25)
where
J = z1+d1−C−xI(e)(P1−K)
+
σ1
. (26)
Now that the share value to investors is expressed in term of share price P1 and other known
parameters at time 1, the share price P1 can be solved using the investor demand function and
market clearing condition,
1
γ1
{
A−C+EI1(z2)+xKI(e)−EI1(tax)
1+xI(e) −P1
}
= 1+ xI(e). (27)
Solving Equation (27) for P1 and option exercise decision, the share value to the manager
can be computed,
FM1 =
A−C+EM1 (z2)+xKI(e)−EM1 (tax)
1+xI(e) . (28)
Note that both the expected project revenue EM1 (z2) and expected tax liability EM1 (tax) are dif-
ferent because the manager’s belief about z2 is normal distribution with mean z1 and variance
σ21. The employee after-tax compensation is
Comp1 =C+η{x(P1−K)I(e)− τp[C+ x(P1−K)I(e)−CA]+} (29)
where τp[C+x(P1−K)I(e)−CA]+ is the personal tax liability caused by option exercise, and
η is the risk aversion discount factor and is applied on the variable income.
The share values perceived by investors and the manager, respectively, and the expected
after-tax compensation for employees at time 0 are the expectation over their corresponding
time 1 values. Again, because the expectations can not be solved analytically, they are com-
puted using Monte Carlo integration. The same method is used to find feasible strategies given
different option grant amount that satisfy employees’ participation constraint. Table 3 illus-
trates such feasible strategies. Note that the share value perceived by the manager increases
with option grant and peaks at around x = 0.5. This shows that the tax effect does not change
the main result of the paper qualitatively.
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4.3 Financial constraints
In the analysis so far, the firm is not financially constrained as its liquid asset A is enough to
pay for employee salary CA. In this section, the scenario of financial constraint is discussed,
that is, A<CA. Because employee stock options reduce the cash salary of employees, they are
useful in helping firms with financial constraint. The firm is also allowed to issue equity at time
0 so that the questions of when to grant options and when to issue equity can be addressed. To
keep the problem manageable, the firm is not allowed to issue equity at time 1.
At time 0, given liquid asset A, the firm decides to issue y0 amount of new equity and
x amount of options to employees. Investors compute the value of each share and provide
their demand for stocks. The market clearing condition at time 0 yields the share price P0.
Equilibrium occurs when (1) the manager maximizes the stock value of shareholders, (2) the
market clears, (3) employees are paid with the same expected utility, and (4) the liquid asset
plus proceeds from the equity offer is enough to pay employee cash salary.
Consider the situation at time 1 first. Suppose that the firm has granted x options to em-
ployees and issued y0 in equity. If the share price at time 0 was P0, then the firm has liquid
asset A+ y0P0. The option strike price K is also equal to P0 because options granted at-the-
money. The number of shares outstanding is therefore 1+ y0 when options are not exercised
and 1+ y0+ x when options are exercised. The share value according to investors is then
F I1 =
A+y0K−C+EI1(z2)+xKI(e)
1+xI(e)+y0
. (30)
This value is then used in determining the demand curve of investors, and market clearing
condition is used for setting the price P1. The derivation of expected option value is very
similar to the one in the base model, and we will only state the results here.
E0[V o] =
σw
1+y0+x
[n(G′)+G′N(G′)] (31)
where w is the investors’ expected revenue at time 1, µw and σ2w are the mean and variance
for w and derived in the previous section, G′ = µw−Q
′
σw and Q′ =−A+C+K+ γ1(1+y0+x)2.
Options are exercised only when w > Q′.
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Given this result for time 1, the share value at time 0 can be expressed as
E j0[V2] = E
j
0
{
A−C+(y0+x)K+z2
1+y0+x
I(w≥ Q′)
+ A−C+y0K+z21+y0 I(w < Q
′)
}
, j ∈ {I,M}. (32)
The manager believes that z2 has mean µz and variance σ20+σ21. Investors believe that the mean
of z2 is different. In the base model, this mean is µz + µd . Here, equity offering is allowed.
Because, as argued before, equity offering is likely to have an information cost which reduces
investors’ optimism on the project, investors’ belief on the mean of z2 is set as µz+µd −βy0.
Using the integration results in the Appendix, it can be shown that
EM0 (V2) =
S+y0K
1+y0
+ x(1+y0+x)(1+y0) [(K−S)N(G
′)− σz2w
σw
n(G′)] (33)
EI0(V2) =
S+y0K+µd−βy0
1+y0
+ x(1+y0+x)(1+y0) [(K−S−µd +βy0)N(G
′)
− σz2w
σw
n(G′)] (34)
where S = A−C+µz. The market clearing condition at time 0 is
1
γ0 (E
I
0(V2)−P0) = 1+ y0 (35)
and P0 = K. Now the equilibrium condition can be written as the following constrained opti-
mization problem:
max
x,C,y0
EM0 (V2) (36)
subject to
C+ηxE0(V o) ≥ CA (37)
1
γ0 (E
I
0(V2)−K) = 1+ y0 (38)
A+ y0K ≥ C. (39)
The first constraint (37) is the participation constraint of employees, the second (38) is the
market clearing condition and the third (39) is the liquidity constraint.
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Table 4 presents numerical results for five different cases ranging from severe investor
undervaluation to extreme overvaluation.11 In Panel A, investors underestimate the project
value by a large margin, and they are also likely to underestimate in the future; in this case,
equity is the only viable method of financing. Options are not used because their values are
too low given that the time 1 price is likely to be low. The last column in the table shows the
difference between the manager’s valuation of one share EM0 (V 2) and initial liquid asset A.
Without any financing cost or gain, this value should be the net present value of the project
(30). As can be seen in Panel A, when the firm faces financial constraint, this value is less
than NPV of the project because of the cost of equity financing.
Panel B presents the scenario for moderate undervaluation by investors. In this case, op-
tions are used initially to finance a project when the firm needs only a small amount of financ-
ing. As the amount of financing needed increases, equities are used much more aggressively
while options increase only slowly.
The results for fair value case are presented in Panel C. Note that, when the firm is not
financially constrained, options are used by the firm but no equity is issued. This is the case of
the base model. Options are used to capture future overvaluation and can enhance shareholder
value. The value EM0 (V2)−A is higher than the project NPV. As the firm requires more and
more funds, options are used as the first choice of financing and equities are issued only when
options cannot satisfy the financing need.
Panel D and Panel E show the results for the scenarios where investors overestimate the
project profitability. In both scenarios, options are granted when the firm has enough cash to
pay employees. Equity is not issued in the moderate overvaluation case, and a small amount
of equity is issued in the extreme case. Without financial constraints, the setup is the same
with the base model with the addition of equity offering at time 0. The fact that options are
used in these scenarios illustrates that the main results developed in Section 3 are robust to
allowing equity offering at time 0.
11The numerical optimization is done using Quasi-Newton method with nonlinear constraints.
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As more funding is needed for operation, options are again the first choice to cover the
initial financial requirement. Equity offering is increased only after the cost saving provided
by options is exhausted. Hence, a pecking order of financing choices emerges for the firm:
use options first and equity second. This result is not surprising, given the result that options
can enhance shareholder value under a wide range of conditions ranging from undervalua-
tion to overvaluation. On the other hand, equity can be beneficial only in the case of high
overvaluation. It is expected that employee stock options will be used as the first choice for
financing.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a new rationale for employee stock options, based on differences in per-
ception between the insider manager and investors. When the manager anticipates the stock
to be possibly overvalued, he might grant employee stock options to save cash compensation
costs. If employees exercise their options when share prices are high, the firm effectively
sells overvalued equity through option exercise to outside investors. Therefore, options may
enhance the stock value for current shareholders.
The model generates a number of interesting implications. Firms are more likely to grant
options when they are overvalued both currently and in the future, or when volatility of in-
vestors’ misperception is high. The equilibrium number of options granted is positively
correlated with current and future misvaluation, volatility of misperception, and correlation
between fundamental value and misperception, but negatively correlated with fundamental
volatility. Future research can test these implications empirically. Another extension is to
study other corporate decisions in a world with heterogeneous beliefs. It would be interest-
ing to model corporate governance and agency problems when investors and managers hold
different beliefs and these beliefs change frequently.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Integration results for normal distribution
Suppose the distribution of u is normal with mean µu and variance σ2u. Then the expected
value of (u−a)+ is
E[(u−a)+] =
∫
∞
a
(u−a) f (u)du = σun(µu−aσu )+(µu−a)N(
µu−a
σu
). (40)
where n(·) and N(·) are the probability density function and cumulative probability function
of the standard normal distribution.
Suppose u and v are jointly normal as u
v
∼ n
 µu
µv
 ,
 σ2u σuv
σuv σ2v
 . (41)
Then the expectation of u given that v is greater than a is
E[uI(v≥ a)] = µuN(µv−aσv )+
σuv
σv
n(µv−a
σv
). (42)
The expectation of u given that v is less than a is
E[uI(v≤ a)] = µuN(a−µvσv )−
σuv
σv
n(µv−a
σv
). (43)
6.2 Optimization with predetermined option strike price
Because it is never optimal for the manager to pay employees more than CA, the manager’s
optimization problem when the option strike price is predetermined can be written as,
max
C,x
EM0 [V2] = A−C+µz+ x1+x
[
(K−A+C−µ)N(G)− σ(z2w)
σw
n(G)
]
(44)
subject to
C+η x1+x [σwn(G)+(µw−Q)N(G)] =CA. (45)
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Then the Lagrangean is
L = EM0 [V2]+ξ{C+η x1+x [σwn(G)+(µw−Q)N(G)]−CA}. (46)
The first order conditions are
∂L
∂x =
x
1+x
[
−n(G)2(1+x)γ1(µw−Q)σz2w
σ3w
−n(G)2(1+x)γ1H
σw
]
+ ( 11+x −
x
(1+x)2
)
[
−n(G)σz2w
σw
+N(G)H
]
+ ξ
{
−2xγ1ηN(G)+η( 11+x −
1
(1+x)2
)[n(G)σw+(µw−Q)N(G)]
}
= 0 (47)
∂L
∂C = −1+ξ(1−
xη
1+x N(G))
+ x1+x [−n(g)
(µw−Q)σz2w
σ3w
−n(G) H
σw
+N(G)] = 0 (48)
∂L
∂ξ = C+η
x
1+x [σwn(G)+(µw−Q)N(G)]−CA = 0 (49)
where
G = µw−Qσw , H = K−A+C−µz,
µw = µz+µd, σ2w = σ20+σ
2
d +2ρσ0σd,
σz2w = σ
2
0+ρσ0σd.
These first order conditions are solved numerically for C, x and ξ and the result is checked to
ensure that the solution is indeed a maximum point.
6.3 Optimization with endogenous option strike price
When the option strike price is determined endogenously, the strike price equals to the price
that investors are willing to pay for shares. Hence the optimization problem needs to have the
additional condition on strike price:
K = EI0[V2]− γ0 (50)
The Lagrangean is
L = EM0 [V2]+ξ{C+η x1+x [σwn(G)+(µw−Q)N(G)]−CA}+ξ1(K−EI0[V2]+ γ0). (51)
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The first order conditions are
∂L
∂x =
x
1+x
[
−n(G)2(1+x)γ1(µw−Q)σz2w
σ3w
−n(G)2(1+x)γ1H
σw
]
+ ( 11+x −
x
(1+x)2
)
[
−n(G)σz2w
σw
+N(G)H
]
+ ξ
{
−2xγ1ηN(G)+η( 11+x −
1
(1+x)2
)[n(G)σw+(µw−Q)N(G)]
}
+ ξ1{− x1+x
[
−n(G)2(1+x)γ1(µw−Q)σz2w
σ3w
−n(G)2(1+x)γ1(H−µd)
σw
]
+ (− 11+x +
x
(1+x)2
)
[
−n(G)σz2w
σw
+N(G)(H−µd)
]
}= 0 (52)
∂L
∂C = −1+ξ(1−
xη
1+x N(G))
+ x1+x [−n(G)
(µw−Q)σz2w
σ3w
−n(G) H
σw
+N(G)]
+ ξ1
{
1− x1+x
[
−n(G) (µw−Q)σz2w
σ3w
−n(G)H−µd
σw
+N(G)
]}
= 0 (53)
∂L
∂K = −
xηξ
1+x N(G)+
x
1+x
[
−n(G) (µw−Q)σz2w
σ3w
−n(G) H
σw
+N(G)
]
+ ξ1
{
1− x1+x
[
−n(G) (µw−Q)σz2w
σ3w
−n(G)H−µd
σw
+N(G)
]}
= 0 (54)
∂L
∂ξ = C+η
x
1+x [σwn(G)+(µw−Q)N(G)]−CA = 0 (55)
∂L
∂ξ1 = H + γ0−µd−
x
1+x
[
−n(G)σz2w
σw
+(H−µd)N(G)
]
= 0 (56)
These first order conditions are solved numerically for C, x, K, ξ and ξ1. The result is checked
to ensure that the solution is indeed a maximum point.
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Table 1: Parameters used in the model.
Parameter Explanation
A Liquid asset that the firm has at time 0.
CA Cash compensation that employees can get by work-
ing elsewhere.
z2 Revenue realization of the project at time 2.
z1 The mean of the distribution on z2 at time 1 according
to the manager’s belief.
w The mean of the distribution on z2 at time 1 according
to investors’ belief.
d1 The difference between w and z1, (d1 = w− z1).
σ21 The variance of z2 at time 1.
µz The mean of the distribution on z1 at time 0.
µd The mean of the distribution on d1 at time 0.
σ20 The variance of the distribution on z1 at time 0.
σ2d The variance of the distribution on d1 at time 0.
ρ Correlation between z1 and d1.
γ0 The slope of investors’ demand curve at time 0.
γ1 The slope of investors’ demand curve at time 1.
d0 The difference on the mean of z2 at time 0 between
investors’ belief and the manager’s belief.
β The information cost of equity offering.
τc Corporate tax rate.
τp Personal tax rate.
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Table 2: Feasible strategies when firm can issue new equity.
This table presents the feasible strategies when firm has the choice to sell new shares at time
1. Option grant (x) and cash compensation (C) with the corresponding total employee com-
pensation (CT ), share value to investors (EI0(V2)), and share value to the manager (EM0 (V2))
are reported. The parameters used are A = 70, CA = 70, µz = 100, σ0 = 20, σ1 = 20, η = 0.9,
γ0 = 8, γ1 = 4, ρ = 0, β = 10, K = 112, d0 = µd = 20.
x C CT EI0(V2) EM0 (V2)
0 70.00 70.00 116.60 102.26
0.1 69.23 70.02 116.47 102.56
0.2 68.78 70.04 116.14 102.75
0.3 68.52 70.05 115.83 102.81
0.4 68.50 70.03 115.49 102.72
0.5 68.72 70.07 115.06 102.40
0.6 69.12 70.09 114.67 102.02
0.7 69.65 70.06 114.30 101.58
0.8 70.10 70.10 114.13 101.28
0.9 70.00 70.00 114.47 101.48
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Table 3: Feasible strategies with tax.
This table presents the feasible strategies when firm can deduct the difference between share
price and option strike and employees need to pay taxes for compensation over CA. Option
grant (x) and cash compensation (C) with the corresponding total employee compensation
(CT ), share value to investors (EI0(V2)), and share value to the manager (EM0 (V2)) are reported.
The parameters used are A= 70, CA = 70, µz = 100, σ0 = 20, σ1 = 20, η= 0.9, γ0 = 8, γ1 = 4,
ρ = 0, K = 112, d0 = µd = 20, τc = τp = 0.3.
x C CT EI0(V2) EM0 (V2)
0 70.00 70.00 104.62 90.36
0.1 69.52 70.02 104.29 90.99
0.2 69.13 70.04 103.95 91.43
0.3 68.82 70.04 103.62 91.71
0.4 68.59 70.03 103.31 91.89
0.5 68.50 70.07 102.97 91.93
0.6 68.43 70.06 102.69 91.91
0.7 68.37 70.02 102.50 91.84
0.8 68.46 70.07 102.29 91.67
0.9 68.53 70.06 102.10 91.52
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Table 4: Equilibrium strategies under financial constraint.
This table presents the equilibrium strategies when firm faces financial constraint. Firm can
use both options and equity. The available liquid asset (A), option grant (x), cash compensation
(C), new equity grant (y0), share price P0, and share value to the manager over liquid asset
(EM0 (V2)−A) are reported. The parameters used are CA = 70, µz = 100, σ0 = 20, σ1 = 20,
η = 0.9, γ0 = 8, γ1 = 4, ρ = 0.
Panel A. d0 = µd =−20
A x C y0 P0 EM0 (V2)−A
70.0 0.000 70.00 0.000 72.00 30.00
67.5 0.000 70.00 0.036 68.54 28.98
65.0 0.000 70.00 0.077 64.95 27.85
62.5 0.000 70.00 0.123 61.19 26.58
60.0 0.000 70.00 0.175 57.21 25.12
57.5 0.000 70.00 0.236 52.91 23.39
55.0 0.067 69.25 0.292 48.76 21.28
Panel B. d0 = µd =−5
A x C y0 P0 EM0 (V2)−A
70.0 0.000 70.00 0.000 87.00 30.00
67.5 0.112 68.79 0.015 84.24 29.66
65.0 0.117 68.74 0.046 80.92 29.21
62.5 0.125 68.66 0.080 77.51 28.69
60.0 0.136 68.57 0.116 73.99 28.09
57.5 0.149 68.45 0.156 70.36 27.39
55.0 0.167 68.29 0.200 66.56 26.55
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Table 4 (continued).
Panel C. d0 = µd = 0
A x C y0 P0 EM0 (V2)−A
70.0 0.183 68.12 0.000 92.17 30.17
67.5 0.262 67.50 0.000 89.65 30.15
65.0 0.276 67.41 0.028 86.39 29.85
62.5 0.271 67.45 0.060 83.02 29.49
60.0 0.267 67.48 0.094 79.56 29.07
57.5 0.265 67.49 0.132 75.99 28.57
55.0 0.266 67.49 0.173 72.28 27.97
Panel D. d0 = µd = 5
A x C y0 P0 EM0 (V2)−A
70.0 0.373 66.77 0.000 97.03 30.78
67.5 0.373 66.77 0.000 94.53 30.78
65.0 0.412 66.56 0.017 91.51 30.65
62.5 0.401 66.62 0.047 88.21 30.42
60.0 0.390 66.68 0.079 84.83 30.14
57.5 0.380 66.74 0.114 81.35 29.79
55.0 0.371 66.79 0.152 77.75 29.37
Panel E. d0 = µd = 20
A x C y0 P0 EM0 (V2)−A
70.0 0.661 65.59 0.055 109.9 33.72
67.5 0.661 65.59 0.055 107.4 33.72
65.0 0.661 65.59 0.055 104.9 33.72
62.5 0.661 65.59 0.055 102.4 33.72
60.0 0.661 65.59 0.056 99.86 33.72
57.5 0.648 65.62 0.084 96.59 33.70
55.0 0.634 65.65 0.114 93.24 33.63
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0 1 2
Period 1 Period 2 
Figure 1. Time line of the model.
Firm has asset A. 
Investors expect z2 to have mean mz+md.
Manager expects z2 to have mean mz.
Employees hired with promise of cash 
compensation C plus x options.
Investors expect z2 to have mean w=z1+d1.
Manager expects z2 to have mean z1.
Options may be exercised. 
Employees are paid salary C.
Revenue z2 is realized.
Firm is liquidated.
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Figure 2. Regions where options are issued in the equilibrium. The lines are thresholds for the firm to grant options. 
Northeast of the lines are regions where options are issued in the equilibrium. Southwest of lines are regions where 
options are not issued. The horizontal axis is investors’ misperception (md). The vertical axis is volatility of future 
investor misperception (sd). The parameters used in the base case (a) are A=70, CA=70, mz =100, s0=20, s1=20,
h=0.9, g0=8, g1=4, r=0. Option strike price K is determined exogenously as mz+md-g0. Only one of the parameters is 
changed in other panels.
(a) Base case. (b) Changing risk aversion (h).
(c) Changing correlation (r). (d) Changing fundamental volatility (s0).
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Figure 3. Regions where options are issued in the equilibrium when investors’ belief is mean reverting. The lines 
are thresholds for the firm to grant options. Northeast of the lines are regions where options are issued in the 
equilibrium. Southwest of lines are regions where options are no t issued. The horizontal axis is current investors’ 
misperception (d0). The vertical axis is volatility of future investor misperception (sd). The mean of future investor 
misperception (md) is equal to 0.  The parameters used in the base case (a) are A=70, CA=70, mz=100, s0=20, 
s1=20, h=0.9, g0=8, g1=4, r=0. Option strike price K is determined exogenously as mz+d0-g0. Only one of the 
parameters is changed in other panels.
(a) Base case. (b) Changing risk aversion (h).
(c) Changing correlation (r). (d) Changing fundamental volatility (s0).
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Figure 4. Comparative statistics of equilibrium option grant with respect to variables. The vertical axis is 
equilibrium option grant (x*). The horizontal axis is the variable of interest. The base set of parameters are A=70, 
CA=70, mz=100, s0=20, s1=20, h=0.9, g0=8, g1=4, d0=md=0 , r=0. Option strike price K is determined 
exogenously as mz+d0-g0. Only one of the parameters is changed in each panel.
(b) Correlation (r).
(c) Fundamental volatility (s0).
(a) Misperception (d0).
(d) Volatility of misperception (sd).
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Figure 5. Price effect of option grant. The vertical axis is the change of share prices before and after option grant 
normalized by the share price before option grant. The horizontal axis is d0 and md. The base set of parameters are 
A=70, CA=70, mz=100, s0=20, s1=20, h=0.9, g0=8, g1=4, r=0. Option strike price K is determined exogenously as 
mz+d0-g0. 
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(b) Correlation (r).(a) Misperception (md).
(c) Fundamental volatility (s0). (d) Volatility of misperception (sd).
Figure 6. Comparative statistics of equilibrium option grant with respect to variables. The vertical axis is 
equilibrium option grant (x*). The horizontal axis is the variable of interest. The base set of parameters are A=70, 
CA=70, mz=100, s0=20, s1=20, h=0.9, g0=8, g1=4, d0=md=0 , r=0. Option strike price K is determined 
endogenously as E0I[V2] -g0. Only one of the parameters is changed in each panel.
